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The United States buys millions of dollars of weapons -- rifles, rocket-propelled grenades
and anti-tank missiles -- to help arm Syrian rebels, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan
militaries.
But there is one thing the Pentagon does not do: it does not always buy from US arms
makers.
A New York City News Service review of audits and federal contracts shows at least ten
US companies are involved as arms providers. But these middlemen don’t always buy
US manufactured munitions. Instead they purchase arms like Kalashnikov and Dragunov
rifles and more in Eastern European markets. Weapons procured for the US Department
of Defense include AK-47 rifles, RPG-7s, ZU-23-2 anti aircraft cannons, PSO-1 optical
sniper sights, 60mm HE mortar rounds, PMK machine guns and AN/PEQ-2A target
pointers.
The review of federal contracts showed that the weapons originate from places such as
Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic., Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. The list
even includes purchases from Russia despite US sanctions imposed after the takeover
of Crimea in 2014; the Pentagon contracted with the US branch of Ukrainian Defense
Consulting Ltd. to buy hundreds of thousands of dollars in small arms from Russia.
At least two of the middleman companies have checkered pasts, with one executive who
faced accusations of trying to bribe a Western African government official for an arms
deal, while another was convicted of fraud and obstructing justice relating to kickback
allegations in a deal for Russian helicopters.
The review of contracts by the New York City News Service identified contracts for at
least $260 million spent by the US government between 2014 and 2016 for Eastern
European weaponry, and handled mainly by the US Special Operations Command,
which oversees efforts with Syrian rebels and elsewhere.
A key reason why the Pentagon buys Eastern European-made weapons is that often the
Syrian rebels - as well as Afghan and Iraqi military - already know how to use them and
don’t need additional training. A US Defense Department budget document in February
2016 noted the Pentagon supplies “former Soviet Bloc (FSB) weapons and ammunition
because these groups currently operate FSB weapons”.
Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, a nonprofit that tracks international arms deals, said the US furnishes Russianstyle weapons to Syrian rebels because they are familiar with how to use these, and
there is the added benefit that when they capture ammunition in Syrian battlefields,
chances are they can use that to resupply their cache because it will work with their
equipment.
The familiarity with Russian-style weapons comes in part because of past training, said
Fabrice Balanche, an associate professor at France’s University of Lyon 2 and a visiting
fellow at The Washington Institute, a nonprofit that focuses on US policy in the Middle
East. He said the reason Syrian rebels “are supplied with Russian-type weapons is
because among them there are many defectors from the Syrian army that is equipped
with this kind of weaponry.”
And these purchases are not just for US-backed Syrian rebels.

Mark Wright, a Pentagon spokesman, said the Defense Department DoD has “worked
with the Iraqi and Afghan military to help supply weapons systems” and “a lot of it was
foreign military sales.”
In addition, Wright said, the US buys foreign weapons to learn about munitions
development around the world. He said the Pentagon purchases a variety of “nonstandard weapons” for experimentation and for evaluation. “It is smart for us to
understand the military capability of enemy forces,” he said.
SUBHEAD: COMPANIES WITH PROBLEMS
Among the companies purchasing arms for Syrian rebels and the Iraq and Afghan
militaries are two companies with executives connected with kickback allegations.
Global Ordnance, records show, was incorporated in 2013 and is based in Sarasota,
Florida, housed in an anonymous one-story office building.
In 2016, Global Ordnance won contracts with the US Special Operation Command to
deliver “small weapons over 200mm through 300mm” and ammunition overseas. The
company was founded by Mark Morales, a veteran in the military supply business, and
has fewer than a dozen workers, federal contracts show. Two contracts, one for $10.5
million and the other for $2.3 million, 1 2 show weaponry would originate from Bulgaria.
On the company’s Facebook page appeared posted pictures -- since removed -- with
company officials meeting with military hardware providers in Bulgaria, Serbia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
What is not mentioned on the Global Ordnance Facebook page or elsewhere on the
company’s website is that in 2010, its founder, Morales, then an executive for another
company, faced criminal charges for his alleged role trying to bribe what he believed
were West African government officials.
Morales had been with a now defunct company called Allied Defense Group. His
LinkedIn profile listed that he joined the firm as vice president in 2006.
Morales partnered on his own, while also continuing working at Allied Defense, with
John Gregory Godsey, the founder of Allied Trading LLC of Decatur, Georgia to strike
munitions deals.
The two partners were approached by Richard Bistrong, another veteran of the military
supply industry. Bistrong pitched a deal saying he had an opportunity to sell weapons to
the tiny West African nation of Gabon. Would Morales and Godsey want to be part of the
deal? They did. Some extra money would have to be paid to Gabonese officials to
grease the deal.
What Morales and others did not know is that Bistrong had become an FBI informant,
and the proposed deal was actually a sting operation to uncover bribery and kickbacks in
the international munitions selling business.
Bistrong approached 22 arms dealers in total, proposing a $15 million transaction to
equip the Gabonese Republican Guard. He said he told them that, in order to get the

contract, they would had to pay a “commission” to the Gabonese defense minister and to
the intermediary.
The opportunity for Morales was, a prosecutor later said, “too profitable to walk away
from, particularly when each of these defendants were being told that this was potentially
just the beginning of the Gabon gravy train and that larger, more lucrative contracts
might be out there in 2010.”
Two undercover FBI agents posed as representatives of the ministry of Defense of
Gabon.
In May 2009, Morales and Godsey met Bistrong at the Mandarin Oriental Hotel in Miami,
Florida. One of the undercover FBI agents posing as the representative of the ministry of
Defense of Gabon was also there.
Bistrong and undercover agent explained to Morales and Godsey the terms of the deal:
they would inflate the price 20 percent, and call it a “commission.” Half of that extra
money would be given to the defense minister. The other half would be split among
intermediaries.
After securing a first contract to procure 30,000 rounds of ammunition, Morales and
Godsey agreed to pay the “commission” into a bank account provided by the undercover
FBI agent according to prosecutors (Link). Godsey wired the “commission” of $2,705
through an intermediary to a bank account provided by the undercover FBI agent;
prosecutors said it was the first installment. The next kickback would be much larger,
$288,000, prosecutors said. Godsey sent an email to Bistrong, copying Morales,
acknowledging the commission payment and informing that weapons would be moved to
a storage facility in Virginia to be prepared for shipment to Gabon, court records show.
Godsey and Morales expected to profit themselves by $300,000 in the second
installment, according to prosecutors.
Morales was recorded attending a cocktail reception at Clyde’s, a restaurant in
Washington, DC, with other defendants and undercover agents, to celebrate the
completion of the first part of the agreement.
In total, 22 people were indicted in what became known as the “Africa Sting.” They were
arrested during an arms fair in Las Vegas. Morales was among those charged with
violating US laws against foreign corruption in a kickback scheme.
Three of the other defendants pled guilty but the case fell apart and no one was
convicted.
The informant, Bistrong, was portrayed as an unreliable witness, suffering from cocaine
addiction and spending time with prostitutes. Defense lawyers challenged his credibility.
They argued that Morales and others could not have known the payments were
kickbacks since Bistrong never used the words “bribe” or “kickback,” but only
“commission,” and that they would “take care of” Gabonese military officials.
Defense lawyers also questioned lost evidence, including deleted text messages
between Bistrong and his FBI handlers.
In 2012, the case ended in a mistrial due to hung jury. Morales did not face further
charges.

Morales listed on his LinkedIn page that he worked for an outdoor furniture company
before returning to the arms merchant business with Global Ordnance.
SUBHEAD: VOSE
In December 2015, Vose Technical Systems Inc. won contracts to supply the Special
Operation Command with small weapons.
One contract called for $15.6 million for procuring weapons that originated from Serbia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 2 3 4.
Vose Technical Systems Inc. was incorporated in 2000 in California and headquartered
in Tacoma, WA. The founder is Greg Vose, a veteran of the arms trade. The company is
registered with the federal government as a woman-owned business under Vose’s
sister, Deborah Vose. That designation can help it secure government contracts under
programs that help female-owned firms.
The company's website says that VTSI is “present” in 6 states and 3 countries, Russia,
Turkey, and Ukraine, and “is a leader in the acquisition and maintenance of Foreign
Materiel specializing in the support of Former Soviet/Russian Federation military
equipment.”
In a telephone interview, Greg Vose said that VTSI has an office in Moscow that
supplies parts for civilian helicopters and the company is careful not to violate trade
sanctions. ”There are some crazy folks who are doing things improperly but I tell you we
are not one of them,” Vose said.
One of its top executives is Jeffrey Howard Stayton, listed as its director of aviation.
Stayton states on his LinkedIn page that he specializes in Russian helicopters like the
Mi-8/17.
Stayton got that expertise during his time in the US Army’s Test and Evaluation
Command in El Paso, Tex. The Command was in charge of buying, modifying and
evaluating aircrafts for the military. Stayton was a chief aviation officer. Part of his job
was evaluating bids on the contracts, and to make sure a contractor performed
satisfactorily.
What is not stated on his LinkedIn page or on the company website is that, in December
2007, Stayton to a sentenced for fraud and obstructing of justice by a federal court in
Alabama.
The charges stemmed from a contract Stayton approved during the leadup to the war in
Afghanistan. He awarded a deal for Russian helicopters to Maverick Aviation Inc. of
Alabama, company owned by William Curtis Childree, described later in court records as
a long-time friend of Stayton.
The mission: Maverik would lead a delegation of US military personnel to Russia, where
it would buy helicopters for US needs. A team of experts would modify the aircraft using
US-made spare parts, and adapt the aircraft for a particular purpose. Then the team
would move the two Mi-17 helicopters to another country in Asia. The exact purpose and
the final destination of the helicopters was not disclosed.

But Maverick was not a reliable company, according to Kimberly Boon, then the senior
Army technical adviser and Russian translator. As a prosecution witness in the trail, she
said, “we had dealt with Maverick on several occasions, purchasing parts and aircraft,
and it was difficult. The aircraft condition was not always the best. In fact, the purchasing
office had removed them from the preferred vendors list at that point in time.”
Problems soon arose with this particular deal. First, the group did not obtain proper
visas, and the problem was not discovered until the team was en route to Russia. They
traveled to Ulan-Ude, in Siberia, on tourist visas, which were not good enough for a
military mission. The mistake was not discovered until the team was already flying to
Russia, and it caused some members to become nervous.
Upon arrival, the team learned the helicopter overhaul was not complete and flight
testing still to be done. Facing cold temperatures and concerns about visas, the group
left Russia before modifications were complete.
Despite this, Stayton approved the final payment for a contract, worth approximately
$4.7 million. After the payment, on January 4, 2002, Childree wired $61,000 to pay off
Stayton's second mortgage on his home.
The investigation found that Stayton did not disclose the payment to the Army or in any
required annual financial statements. In his defense, Stayton maintained the payment
was a loan from a friend. He was sentenced to five years and three months in prison.
Greg Vose said Stayton works for a sister company, Vose Technical Systems Aviation,
procuring civilian helicopters, and is not involved in the company’s military Special
Operations Command contracts.
VTS Aviation’s website (backup) shows that the company deals military supplies and
that in "July 2013 VTS acquires two factory new Mi-171E aircraft from the Ulan-Ude
Aviation Plan, Ulan-Ude, Russia;" this is the same helicopters and the same place in
Siberia where Jeff Styton went for the procurement mission that lead to his sentence.
Pentagon spokesman Wright said the companies doing business with the Defense
Department are subjected to a “rigorous vetting process”: this includes checking the
equality of the munitions and checking the background of subcontractors to avoid
procurement to ensure they do not buy weapons from “unapproved sources” such as
North Korea, Iran and Syria.
But Wright acknowledged that “mistakes are still possible” and the vetting process does
not routinely include checking the criminal records of company executives. “They have to
follow the rules in hiring people that are eligible,” he said.

